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I
Introduction
ith introduction of freely float-
ing exchange rates in 1973,
governments have intervened
actively in foreign exchange markets. While
the nature and pattern of intervention has
varied from country to country, a common
desire to prevent unduly large movements
in their exchange rates can be observed.
The need for ‘managing’ exchange rates
emerged by 1985 as a consensus response
of all major countries to excessive ex-
change rate fluctuations that accompanied
the abolishment of fixed-price converti-
bility. Exchange rates exhibited consider-
able volatility and increased capital mo-
bility overrode the insulation offered by
floating exchange rates, straining the
monetary authorities with instability. Sub-
sequent developments in the international
economy, viz, medium-term mis-alignment
of exchange rates epitomised by the sharp
appreciation of the dollar in the early
eighties, prolonged current account imbal-
ances, and massive fiscal deficits further
complicated the task of macro-economic
management. These experiences under-
mined the theoretical belief that balance
of payments deficits would automatically
adjust through variations in the market
price of foreign exchange, giving com-
plete monetary autonomy to policy-mak-
ers to secure internal objectives under a
floating exchange rate arrangement.
International experience with floating
exchange rates has some relevance for
India, which switched to a floating ex-
change rate regime in early 1993. This was
accomplished after a gradual transition
between 1991-93 through a dual exchange
rate regime. Prior to the floating exchange
rate period, exchange rate flexibility was
pursued through a currency basket peg.
The change in regime from a multi-currency
peg to a floating price convertibility pro-
vides sufficient motivation for a preli-
minary analysis of exchange rate behaviour
and management between 1993-99, using
international experience with floating ex-
change rates as a reference point. This
paper aims to examine changes in the
rupee-dollar exchange rate behaviour as-
sociated with change in exchange rate
regime in a comparative perspective. A
second aim of the paper is to document
the response of the central bank to ex-
change rate instability during this period.
The paper is divided into four sections.
Section II looks at exchange rate variabil-
ity and its evolving relationship with prices.
The main objective here is to look for
changes that could possibly be related to
increased flexibility of exchange rate re-
gime after 1993 and observable common
patterns between Indian and international
experience. Section III traces exchange
rate management by the central bank in
relation to policy objectives. Inter linkages
with domestic monetary conditions are
also briefly examined in this section.
Section IV draws the conclusions.
II
Exchange Rate Behaviour
This section will examine some aspects
of the rupee-dollar rate taking some stylised
facts about exchange rate behaviour ob-
served in transition from fixed to flexible
exchange rate regimes elsewhere in the
world as a benchmark. Two aspects are
explored here: one, the association, if any,
between exchange rate movements and
choice of exchange rate regime, and two,
the evolution of the relationship between
exchange rates and prices.
Exchange rate variability: International
experience has shown that the transition
from a fixed to a floating exchange rate
regime has unambiguously been accom-
panied by a rise in exchange rate volatil-
ity.1 Practically all industrialised countries
that changed over to flexible exchange rate
regimes after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods arrangement witnessed a rise in the
variability of their exchange rates. Given
the switchover to a flexible exchange rate
arrangement in India in 1993, we look for
observable differences between the two
regimes to see whether there is any con-
formity with international experience in
this regard. Note however that the previous
exchange rate regime in India was not
strictly a fixed-rate arrangement, being
linked to a multi-currency basket, making
it closely approximate an adjustable peg
[Joshi 1984].
We begin the analysis by looking for
differences in exchange rate volatility in
the adjustable-peg and floating exchange
rate periods in India. Figure 1 illustrates
variability of the rupee where the yearly
changes of the rupee/dollar (spot) rate are
plotted between 1970-99. It can be ob-
served from the plot that movements in the
rupee-dollar rate do not exhibit any sig-
nificant behavioural change in the two
exchange rate regimes. A statistical mea-
sure of volatility, the standard deviation
of yearly changes, shows practically con-
stant rupee-dollar rate variability (7.6 for
1970-90 and 7.0 for 1993-99. Note that
the years 1991-92 have been excluded
from these computations due to two major
exchange rate adjustments in 1991 and the
turbulence specific to the transition pe-
riod). Since short-term movements might
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Figure 1: Re/$ Variability between 1970-98
Re/Dollar rate (yearly change in per cent). A positive change indicates a depreciation of the rupee.
indicate exchange rate volatility more
appropriately, we also examined variabil-
ity with respect to monthly changes in the
exchange rate. However, the monthly data
(not plotted here) too shows only a mar-
ginal increase in nominal variability from
1.43 to 1.7 between the two time periods.
The fact that exchange rate volatility has
not risen after the transition runs contrary
to the experiences of other, particularly
industrialised countries, all of which typi-
cally experienced a rise in exchange rate
variability accompanying the shift from
fixed to floating exchange rate regimes.
One reason for this observation could be
the management of the exchange rate in
India after 1993 vis-a-vis instability as a
stable exchange rate is one of the explicit
objectives of exchange rate policy. The
degree to which the exchange rate is ‘suc-
cessfully managed’ through intervention,
direct as well as indirect, by the monetary
authority would then obviously colour
observed volatility in exchange rate
movements. This aspect is scrutinised in
Section III where we find a significant
intervention response to volatility in ex-
change rate movements.
Exchange rate and prices: We next look
at exchange rate movements and their
relationship with the movements of one of
its fundamental determinants, i e, the price
level. The theory of purchasing power parity
(PPP) provides the theoretical rationale for
the belief that floating exchange rates would
offset trend inflation differentials. Thus,
it predicts that differentials between for-
eign and domestic rates of inflation caused
by an increase/decrease in the foreign price
level would be offset by an appreciation/
depreciation of the domestic currency in
equilibrium.
Figure 2 plots the dynamics of exchange
rates and prices, the rupee/dollar nominal
exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange
rate, i e, the PPP rate (ratio of domestic
to foreign prices) between 1970-98. We
observe that changes in the rupee/dollar
rate and the difference between Indian and
US inflation rates (consumer price index)
are not of equal magnitude as the PPP
theory would predict. Particularly after
1993, when we would expect movements
in the nominal exchange rate to reflect
changes in the price levels, given the
increased flexibility of the exchange rate
regime, the exchange rate movements
exceed the change in price levels. The two
series also move in the opposite direction
during this period, suggesting that relative
inflation rates do not provide a satisfactory
description of exchange rate behaviour
in this period. This feature conforms to the
experience of industrialised countries
with floating exchange rates where PPP
does not hold in the short-run, indicating
sluggishness of output prices.
Since purchasing power parity essen-
tially refers to a long-run equilibrium
relationship between price levels and the
exchange rates, a long-run analysis might
be better able to shed light on this rela-
tionship for India. The aim here is to
examine whether the rupee-dollar exchange
rate tends to revert to its equilibrium (PPP)
value under the flexible exchange rate
arrangement after 1993. Figure 3 shows
the evolution of the rupee-dollar rate
(market rate) and the PPP rate (ratio of
domestic to foreign price levels). We have
used 1993 as a base year to calculate the
indices.2 The choice of base year reflects
an implicit belief that the exchange rate
was equivalent to its ‘equilibrium’ value
in that year but is of no consequence here
as the sole aim is to examine the reversion
of the exchange rate to its PPP value [De
Grauwe 1991:67].
Figure 3 reveals a consistently over-
valued exchange rate with the gap between
the two series reducing over time. This
convergence reflects an exchange rate
policy of active rupee devaluation fol-
lowed between 1986-90 [Joshi and Little
1994:277]. After the two major exchange
rate adjustments in 1991, the market rate
moves closer to its PPP value. In the period
after the float, the market rate is close to its
1993 value; also note the long periods of
stability with periodic adjustments of the
deviations from the base value. The latter
suggests the ‘parity’ rule guiding exchange
rate policy and the next section offers
further empirical evidence in this regard.
One implication of the fact that exchange
rates move more than the national price
levels has been a high correlation between
The nominal Re/$ exchange rate is the price of dollars in terms of rupees. A rise is a nominal depreciation
of the rupee and a nominal appreciation of the dollar. The PPP rate is the Indian CPI divided by the US CPI.
Annual per cent changes are shown here.






































































Figure 3: Nominal and PPP Exchange Rates (1993=100)





































































nominal exchange rate real exchange rate
Figure 4: Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Movements, 1970-98
Nominal exchange rate Real exchange rate
The nominal rate is the price of dollar in rupees. The real Re/$ rate is the nominal rate multiplied by the ratios
of US CPI and the Indian CPI. A rise is a nominal/real depreciation of the rupee. Figures are yearly
percentage changes of the two series.
nominal and real exchange rates in the
floating exchange rate period for
industrialised countries. Does the rupee/
dollar rate behaviour generalise to this
international pattern? Figure 4 plots the
nominal and real exchange rates, where the
real exchange rate is defined as the nomi-
nal exchange rate times the ratio of the
foreign (US) to domestic price levels. The
evidence on co-movement of these two
series is a test for the sticky price hypo-
thesis in the short run. To elaborate, if
output prices adjusted constantly so as to
clear the market as proposed under the
flexible-price models, then nominal ex-
change rate variability should not affect
movements in the real exchange rate. The
post-1993 data for India, however, does
not support this proposition; in fact, the
correlation between the two series increases
after the float to 0.97 against a 0.73 prior
to the float. This suggests that output prices
move slowly in the short run, so that greater
nominal exchange rate variability impacts
upon the real exchange rate.
In the following section we focus upon
exchange rate management during the float-
ing exchange rate period by the Reserve
Bank in relation to objectives of exchange
rate policy. We focus upon intervention
measures, direct as well as indirect, used
by the central bank to realise their policy
objectives and briefly touch upon how




A notable feature of the post-float period
has been the use of heavy exchange rate
management by the central bank. Figure 5
plots yearly changes in foreign reserves
(deflated by the wholesale price index at
1990 prices). We observe that annual
reserve changes are higher in the floating
exchange rate period than in the adjustable
peg regime, suggesting that the size of
central bank interventions in the foreign
exchange market has increased. The mean
absolute change in foreign exchange re-
serves during 1970-90 is merely Rs 0.03
billion which increases to 0.73 billion after
the rupee started to float in March 1993
(the average size of intervention for the
transition period, 1991-92, which was
particularly turbulent, is 0.64 billion).
A perusal of the central bank’s annual
reports during the period under review
shows that the RBI uses both direct and
indirect intervention to manage the ex-
change rate. Direct intervention refers to
purchases and sales in intervention cur-
rency (i e, US dollars) in both spot and
forward markets, whereas indirect inter-
vention alludes to the use of quantitative
restrictions, reserve requirements and in-
terest rate flexibility to smoothen tempo-
rary mismatches between demand and
supply of foreign currency. Table 1 pre-
sents some facts about the central bank’s
intervention activity in the post-float pe-
riod. It can be observed that intervention
activity by the central bank was consider-
able in the early years of the float.
Since in principle, the intervention strat-
egy of a central bank will be determined
by what the policy objectives are, we
examine intervention behaviour of the
Reserve Bank in the context of the country’s
stance regarding its currency and its ex-
change rate policy. A review of official
accounts of exchange rate policy suggest
that the Reserve Bank’s exchange rate
management strategy is centred on main-
taining stability and keeping the exchange
rate aligned to fundamentals. Consider, for
example, the following statements: “...it
will be important to maintain a stable REER
...to prevent an erosion in the incentives
available to exporters” [GoI 1993:94:85]
“the Reserve Bank of India stands ready
to intervene to maintain orderly market
conditions and to curb excessive specula-
tion” [GoI 1995-96:103] and   “...exchange
Table 1: Interventionsa by RBI during
1993-98
(Rs billion)







Note: a Intervention calculated as changes in
























































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Intervention and Movements in the Spot Rates
 Spot rate  Reserves
Time
rate management continues its focus on
smoothing excessive volatility in the ex-
change rate to ensure that the ex-change
rate remains consistent with economic fun-
damentals” [GoI 1997-98:92].
These statements indicate that the cen-
tral bank responds to exchange rate vola-
tility in the foreign exchange market, with
the intention of stabilising the nominal
exchange rate. They also suggest a belief
in the ‘real targets’ approach under which
the central bank would aim at prevention
of ‘misalignment’3 of the exchange rate.
Pursuit of a real exchange rate target typi-
cally aims at controlling the level of the
real exchange rate, either to insulate it from
internal and external shocks and therefore
keep it constant, or achieve a different
(usually depreciated to make exports more
competitive) level.
Figure 6 plots monthly intervention
activity of the Reserve Bank during this
period along with changes in the nominal
exchange (spot) rate to bring out the as-
sociation, if any, between central bank
almost constant between 31.23 – 31.81
rupees per US dollar, despite a widening
inflation differential between domestic and
foreign (US) prices.
The main source of disturbance during
this period (March 1993-August 1995) was
heavy capital inflows leading to an appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate, which
was countered by intervening purchases
by the Reserve Bank. In the central bank’s
own words, intervention strategy was aimed
at “...protecting the export competitive-
ness and consolidating the foreign exchange
reserves” [RBI 1994-95:X-17]. Clearly, a
rigid defence of the exchange rate (avert-
ing an appreciation) led to very large
interventions during these two years. The
exchange rate appears to have been main-
tained at its ‘equilibrium value’, i e, the
March 1993 value, confirming the central
bank’s commitment to its policy objec-
tives. It also indicates pursuit of a ‘real
target’ by the central bank.4
Figure 6 highlights two periods of vola-
tility in the nominal exchange rate, i e,
September 1995-June 1996 and August
1997-June 1998 which have been used by
us to study exchange rate management of
the central bank. Table 2 (columns 2 and 3)
presents some of measures of exchange
rate volatility during periods of exchange
rate pressure. The last column of Table 2
provides evidence of central bank response,
i e, intervention. A close positive associa-
tion can be observed between intervention
and exchange rate volatility from Table 2,
confirming the observation from Figure 6.
Note for instance the co-movement bet-
ween intervention and volatility between
July-September 1995 and January-March
1996. The central bank initially defended
the exchange rate, giving way to a re-
adjustment in September 1995, when the
rupee’s value vis-a-vis the dollar rose from
Table 2: Exchange Rate Volatility and Intervention in Periods of Pressure
Period Nominal Exchange Rate Variability vis-a-vis US Dollar Interventions
April-June 1995 0.211 -0.142 5.803
July-September 1995 3.59 1.28 10.30
October-December 1995 0.66 9.85* 7.88
January-March 1996 3.95 0.29 12.11
April-June 1996 0.92 0.10 5.21
July-September 1997 1.30 1.06 7.69
October-December 1997 2.80 6.61* 4.55
January-March 1998 0.99 1.88 10.61
April-June 1998 1.90 5.59* 8.03
July-September 1998 0.17 2.56* 10.42
Notes:1 Standard deviation of absolute percentage change in the bilateral rupee/dollar exchange rate;
2 Percentage change of the median value of the exchange rate in the current quarter over the
median value of the preceding quarter;
3 Quarterly averages expressed as a percentage of the yearly average of gross intervention
undertaken;
* Intervention leading to realignment of the exchange rate.
intervention and exchange rate movements.
The period immediately following the
floating of the rupee, 1993-95, is a period
of relative calm in terms of exchange rate
movements. A closer look at the data
however reveals extensive management
on the part of the central bank with the

























































































































































































































 Reserve money  Nominal exchange rate (monthly change in per cent)
Figure 7: Nominal Exchnage Rate and Reserve Money, 1993-99
Table 3: Monetary Measures used by RBI to Counter Exchange Rate Movements: 1993-98
Cash Reserve/Statutory Liquidity Interest Rate changes Other Direct Measures
Ratio Changes
October 1995 Increases in NRER, NR(NR)RD a/cs
over their outstanding levels on
October 27, 1995 exempted from
CRR requirements.
January-February CRR requirements for all FCNR (B)
1996 and NR(NR) Deposits relaxed;
average CRR on NRER liabilities
reduced from 14 to 12 per cent.
April 1996 NRER deposits exempted from CRR
requirements; SLR on NRER reduced
from 30 to 25 per cent.
November- CRR increased by 0.5 per cent;
December 1997 incremental CRR of 10 per cent
on NR(E)RA and NR(NR) removed;
January 1998 Bank rate raised from 9 to 11 per cent;
CRR raised from 10 to 10.5 pre cent;
general refinance limit reduced from
1 to 0.25 per cent of fortnightly average
outstanding aggregate deposits;
export refinance limit reduced from
100 to 50 per cent of the increase
in outstanding export credit eligible
for such refinance over the level of
such credit as on January 16, 1996;
June 1998
August 1998 CRR maintained by banks raised from
10 to 11 per cent;
CRR – cash reserve ratio;
NRER,  NR (NR) RD, FCNR(B), etc
–various categories of
Non-resident accounts
ADs – authorised dealers
Rise in interest rate on NRER deposits;
interest surcharge on import finance;
reduction in interest rate concessions on
export finance between 3-6 months
Interest rate surcharge on import finance raised
from 15 to 25 per cent; interest rates on post-
shipment export credit freed to expedite
exports payments into the country.
Interest rates on NRER term deposits over
two years freed.
Interest rate on post-shipment export credit
increased from 13 to 15 per cent;  interest rate
on fixed rate repos increased by 0.5 per cent;
Interest rate on fixed rate repos increased
from 7 to 9 per cent;
Lowering of interest rate on export credit
on ‘incremental exports’ over the base
year level of exports in 1997-98;
Interest rate on fixed rate repos hiked
from 5 to 8 per cent;
Banks barred from offering forward contracts
based on past performance; declaration of
exposure suspended;
FII allowed to undertake foreign exchange cover
on their 'incremental equity investment from
June 12, 1998; merchants advised to monitor
credit utilisation to meet genuine foreign
exchange demand but not unanticipated import
requirements beyond a reasonable period to
discourage inventory build-up; domestic
financial intermediaries to buy back their won
debt or other Indian paper from the international
market; Banks acting on behalf of FIIs allowed
to but foreign exchange directly from the RBI at
the prevailing market rate.
ADs allowed to offer forward cover directly to
FIIs upto 15 per cent of their investment as on
June 11, 1998; facility of rebooking of cancelled
import contracts withdrawn; facility for splitting
forward and spot leg for a commitment
withdrawn; extension of time limit for realisation
of export payments allowed only in exceptional
circumstances; Ads advised to report their peak
intra-day positions.
31.81 (end of period exchange rate,  Au-
gust 1995) to 33.96 (September 1995)
and further to 34.61 in October 1995. A
depreciation of almost 10 per cent can be
discerned from column 3, Table 2 during
this period; after the re-adjustment, inter-
vention activity subsides somewhat. This
is confirmed by the central bank’s own
account of the episode “...due to the policy
guided correction in the exchange rate of
the rupee in the second half of 1995-96,
the rupee remained stable during 1996-97”
[RBI 1995-96:X-12]. The ‘parity’ rule
seems to have guided the re-alignment;
this is also clear from Figure 3 where we
find that the adjustment moves the market
rate closer to the March 1993 base value.Economic and Political Weekly January 29, 2000 370
A further depreciation (3.7 per cent) in
January 1996 again prompted intervention
(sales) by the Reserve Bank and appears
to have been successful, as a further de-
preciation was averted and the rupee’s
value fell to 35.04 (Rs/$), which was the
re-adjusted price accepted by the central
bank. In fact, the rupee-dollar rate was
maintained at this value until July 1997.
Note that this again aligns the market rate
close to the March 1993 ‘equilibrium’
value (Figure 3).
In the second period of exchange rate
pressure, the fluctuations in the foreign
exchange market possibly originated in the
expectations of economic agents about
future depreciation in line with the curren-
cies of neighbouring countries as India’s
competitiveness was directly hurt in inter-
national markets. The Reserve Bank’s
intervention activity again increased with
volatility in the foreign exchange market.
A small upward adjustment (1.8 per cent)
took place in August 1997, which seems
to have been accepted by the central bank.
This was followed by a larger one in
November-December 1997 (approximately
7 per cent), when intervention activity was
relatively subdued. Between January-July
1998, substantial interventions took place,
when the Reserve Bank resisted further
pressures upon the exchange rate. Despite
the direct as well as indirect (cf Table 3)
intervening measures, further re-alignments
of the market rate were accepted as indi-
cated by column 3 of Table 2. Again, the
‘parity’ rule seems to have been followed
by the Reserve Bank.
These observations suggest that the
central bank is averse to excessive fluc-
tuations and aims to moderate exchange
rate movements when there is volatility in
the foreign exchange rate market. They
also indicate a ‘parity’ rule guiding the
periodic re-alignments that are managed
by the central bank, as indicated by the
latter’s withdrawal from intervening activ-
ity once the markets have stabilised around
the re-adjusted rate. Presumably, the in-
tervention strategy is centred upon moving
the real exchange rate in order to effect
trade flows; this is pursued by moderating
movements of the nominal exchange rate
in relation to the price level.
Intervention and domestic monetary
conditions: Has intervention been success-
ful? One way of examining this question
is to see whether intervention is sterilised
or non-sterilised. With sterilised interven-
tion, the monetary authorities buy or sell
foreign exchange and offset it with open
market operations so that the domestic money
stock remains unaltered. Conversely, non-
sterilised intervention implies that the domes-
tic money stock is affected. The implication
of this type of intervention is that the automatic
adjustment mechanism via domestic money
stock expansion/contraction, interest rate
effects and subsequent substitution between
foreign and domestic currency assets by
economic agents help stabilise the exchange
rate. The absence of a monetary effect with
a sterilised intervention has led to almost a
consensus amongst economists that it
is ineffective. Thus, the answer whether
an intervention is effective or not will
depend upon whether there is sterilisation
or not.
An indirect way of looking for such
evidence is to observe changes in the
monetary base in relation to intervention
activity. Figure 7 plots movements in
reserve money along with changes in the
rupee/dollar rate. We can observe a nega-
tive correlation between the two move-
ments between April 1995-April 1996 and
again for some months in the second period
of exchange rate tension in July 1997-
April 1998. From Figure 6 we observe that
the central bank was selling dollars during
April-July 1995, implying thereby that
rupees were being purchased leading to an
expansion in the domestic money stock.
Figure 7 shows a positive change in money
stock during this period, suggesting that
there were no offsetting operations by the
central bank. However, the adjustment
predicted by theory will not have the desired
effect in the Indian context in the presence
of a closed capital account. We therefore
observe from Table 3, which presents the
indirect monetary measures complement-
ing the direct intervention of the Reserve
Bank, a range of interest rate and reserve
requirement changes that directly impinge
upon domestic liquidity conditions. It can
be observed that the October 1995 inter-
vention was combined interest rate and
reserve requirement changes to bring the
rupee to “...levels consistent with funda-
mentals” [RBI 1995-96:x-13]. In the second
period of exchange rate pressure, begin-
ning July 1997, we find a similar tendency,
though the phenomenon is not so pro-
nounced. The November-December 1997
depreciation is accompanied by a mone-
tary expansion; a brief monetary contrac-
tion and then expansion, indicating part
sterilisation follow the upward movement
of the exchange rate in April-June 1998.
It is therefore difficult to conclude with
certainty that direct intervening operations
are successful or otherwise, because the central
bank does not rely on direct intervention
alone to counter exchange rate fluctuations.
It also intervenes indirectly through trade and
interest rate restrictions to correct demand-
supply imbalances in the foreign exchange
market, a summary of which is given in Table
3. These measures directly affect the ability
of market participants to surplus foreign
currency or delay export receipts by making
it costlier to do so. Similarly, varying interest
rates affect the capacity of importers. Finally,
foreign exchange market spillovers into the
domestic market are prevented indirectly
through variations in reserve requirements
even though no sterilisation might be undertaken.
IV
Conclusion
This paper has focused upon a prelimi-
nary anlaysis of exchange rate behaviour
and its management in the short period of
floating exchange rate regime in India with
the use of descriptive statistics. Several
interesting features emerged from the
analysis. We find that exchange rate vola-
tility does not increase in the period im-
parting greater flexibility to the exchange
rate, which is contrary to the experiences
of other countries in this regard. Second,
we find evidence of reversion of the
exchange rate to its purchasing power parity
value over a long period. This, however,
is directly linked to exchange rate policy
measures prior to 1993 and exchange rate
management thereafter.
As is the case with most countries, what
we observe in India is an ‘intermediate’
regime, which lies between the two ex-
treme textbook versions of fixed and free
exchange rate regimes, and where the
exchange rate is ‘managed’. A scrutiny of
the exchange rate management strategy of
the Reserve Bank reveals a strong com-
mitment to exchange rate stability and
keeping the exchange rate aligned to one
of its fundamentals, i e, the price level.
Thus we find a positive response of direct
intervention activity to rise in exchange
rate volatility. We also find that interven-
tion activity subsides once a re-alignment
has taken place; the adjustments appear to
be tied to the price level. It is possible that
speculation by economic agents arises in
situations when the ‘fundamentals’ are on
a divergent path.
We are unable to comment conclusively
upon whether intervention operations of
the Reserve Bank are successful or not, since
these are often in conjunction with indirectEconomic and Political Weekly January 29, 2000 371
measures. Though such restrictions cannot be
a permanent substitute for a continuous
depreciation of the exchange rate when the
domestic inflation exceeds that of its trading
partners, use of trade restrictions indicates
that the Reserve Bank is not averse to using
them to avoid a real devaluation that a
commitment to a real target might demand.
There are implications for these operations
in the future with the progressive dismantling
of foreign exchange restrictions, both current
as well as capital. The scale of intervention
required to preserve exchange rate stability
is likely to rise in the absence of these con-
trols. The implications for intervention activity
are even more significant in a situation where
the capital account is liberalised. Lessons
from other countries indicate that foreign ex-
change markets are unable to cope with
unrestricted capital flows, many of which
represent unstable expectations that in-
duce movements in the exchange rate. Since
these relative price changes are not caused
by changes in the fundamentals, modera-
tion of such changes would be an obvious
objective of exchange rate management in
the future. A rise in the scale of future
intervention would therefore imply a
significant build-up of reserves.
Notes
[The views expressed are the author’s own and
not of the institution to which she belongs.]
1 See Mussa (1986) for an exhaustive thorough
account of this empirical observation.
2 The base of March 1993 is reported to have
been notionally established as an ‘equilibrium’
rate for the rupee by the official authorities.
See EPW Research Foundation (1997).
3 Misalignment refers to a persistent departure
of an exchange rate from its long-run equili-
brium level.
4 A real exchange rate target approach requires
determination of an ‘equilibrium exchange
rate’, which (in theory is determined by
purchasing power parity). Other factors that
influence it are the demand and supply of
exports and imports, incomes from and the
rates of return on domestic and foreign assets,
and an estimated persistent capital flow that
are expected to be sustainable [Williamson
1993:189].
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